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I. Introduction 
 
 One of the by-products of the recent global financial crisis has been the loss of the 
monetary policy practice under which a central bank simply selects an interest rate to 
serve as its policy instrument and announces a level consistent with achieving a specified 
macroeconomic objective.  As a policy measure, the practice of raising or the lowering 
the policy rate was designed to signal when the central bank wished monetary conditions 
to become easier or tighter, the direction of change determined by the need to attain an 
overriding policy objective. In analyzing what has happened to this institutional practice, 
we take the maintenance of an explicit inflation rate target to be the central bank’s over-
riding policy objective.  To describe how such a policy was implemented, we draw on the 
practice of the four major central bank jurisdictions receiving most prominent coverage: 
namely, the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, and the 
European Central Bank.1 
The current global financial crisis has proved unsettling for the use of the interest 
rate approach precisely because the crisis appears to require an interest rate level below 
zero to keep inflation from falling below its target.  In what follows we explain what has 
become of the interest rate approach to monetary policy and analyze whether it can 
and/or should continue to function in such circumstances by posing and then answering 
three interrelated questions: first, what is needed for the interest-rate approach to become 
effective under normal circumstances; second, what is needed to maintain that 
effectiveness when a crisis occurs; and third, what are the implications for monetary 
policy if the interest-rate approach cannot remain effective during a major financial crisis. 
                                                 
1  See the first six references listed at the end of the paper. 
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 How a financial crisis affects policy practice requires an understanding of how the 
announcement of a value for a policy rate can change financial conditions under normal 
conditions. The causal process at work is less than clear in most descriptions of the 
transmission mechanism.2 That is, most descriptions of monetary policy explain well 
enough the process by which a change in all interest rates resulting from a change in the 
policy rate cause the economy to move towards its target.  What is less adequately 
addressed is how or why other interest rates should move in conjunction with such an 
announcement. It is because a financial crisis interferes with this linkage that our analysis 
begins with a more explicit analysis of what must happen under normal conditions. The 
second part of the paper then deals with how the crisis can disrupt the effect of the policy 
rate change on other interest rates, thus diminishing its effectiveness.  Awareness of the 
conditions necessary for an effective policy rate approach in normal times indicates what 
needs to be done to enable the interest rate approach to better cope with a financial crisis.3  
The final part of this paper then deals with consequences for monetary policy in 
general, and the policy rate approach in particular, when a financial crisis becomes so 
severe that policy rate operations by the monetary authority are unable to prevent prices 
from achieving their targeted rate of growth or even keep inflation rates above zero.  In 
these cases, the interest rate approach can made effective only through the assistance of 
supplementary policies.  Our general conclusion is then that while the interest rate 
approach to monetary policy remains valid under normal times, it is always vulnerable to 
                                                 
2 The Taylor rule, used most often to explain the setting of the U.S. federal funds rate, is often described as 
a black box mechanism through which a change in the federal funds rate automatically changes all other 
market rates without requiring further action by the Fed.  See also Woodford, 2003. 
3 For example, knowing how a crisis can affect the interest rate approach may provide a better basis for 
developing a meaningful stress test to assess the likely consequences of greater uncertainty in times of 
financial instability. 
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global financial crises. And even though the operation of the approach can be improved 
in times of crisis, the approach may still not be effective enough to allow the interest rate 
approach to achieve its desired inflation target. 
II. Policy Interest-rate Operations in Normal Times 
 An attribute of normal times is the existence of financial stability, times when 
bankruptcy risk omni-present in a financial system lies below a level where a significant 
financial failure would threaten the viability of the entire system.  In such circumstances, 
the central bank need not explicitly counter systemic risk.  Market interest rates serve to 
equate lending and borrowing behaviour and incorporate sufficient rewards for degrees of 
risk aversion and levels of risk tolerance that reflect regular trading conditions.  Similarly, 
in effecting the intermediation of these activities financial institutions are adequately 
capitalized, with the level of risk in each transaction well understood and managed.  
 When such conditions prevail, the interest rate approach to monetary policy can 
concentrate on its primary objective of controlling inflation without having to compensate 
for the complications imposed by financial instability.4 Hence in practice, a central bank 
will react to its inflation forecast--its forward-looking view of the current factors that are 
expected to drive inflation above or below the inflation target--by adjusting its preferred 
policy rate.  That is when the central bank’s forecast indicates that inflation will come in 
below its targeted level the bank will announce a new lower value for its policy rate.  
                                                 
4 This seems obvious enough following any severe shock to financial stability but appears to be too often 
over-looked in any pre-crisis description or understanding of the transmission process. However, pre-crisis 
awareness of the implicit role of financial stability in the effective functioning of the transition process 
would serve to greatly reduce the surprise that often comes with the impact of a financial crisis on the 
effective operation of the policy rate approach. 
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In most jurisdictions the instrument whose yield is chosen for the announcement 
is typically of short duration, running from an over-night funds rate (in Canada) to at 
most a one or two week borrowing/lending rate (in Europe). And while only a single new 
policy rate is announced, the announcement is intended to provide a new benchmark for 
market rates all across the entire liquidity spectrum – a term structure that includes not 
only the lending rates offered by financial institutions but also the borrowing rates paid 
for the funds raised by these intermediary institutions. 
In many cases the central bank’s announcement of a change in its key policy rate 
is in itself sufficient to lead both the market rate of its policy instrument and all other 
market interest rates up or down in unison – from the short through the long term, on both 
the borrowing and the lending sides of the market. Within the banking system itself, the 
policy rate announcement is intended to lead flexible lending and deposit rates to move in 
unison, with the spread between the two remaining constant. When this happens the 
policy rate change has served as a pure market signal; the market has accepted the central 
bank’s view of where market yields are going, consistent with its unchanged 
macroeconomic objective.   
 It is part of the transmission process that when the policy rate signal does bring 
about a new lower level of interest rates that there is a concomitant loosening of financial 
conditions.  That is, in the absence of the central bank’s signaled decline in the policy 
rate, market interest rates would have remained too high to provide the required level of 
stimulus needed to produce the rise in investment and fall in savings needed to maintain 
the targeted rate of inflation.  The description of how lowered interest rates work to affect 
the rest of the economy and so help achieve the Bank’s macroeconomic policy objective 
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is well described in the literature and indeed constitutes the main part of standard 
descriptions of the transmission process.5 What is less well described is why market 
interest rates should be affected in the first place, especially without any direct reliance 
on a change in base money (i.e., the consolidated balances of the banking system with the 
central bank).  
 If we stay with the specific case of an easing of the financial conditions needed to 
maintain the targeted inflation rate, effective monetary policy requires the policy rate 
announcement to translate first into a reduction of that particular market rate and then 
into a reduction in all other interest rates. However, what is not self-evident is why 
markets will respond to any central bank announcement that merely suggests that interest 
rates should be lower -- especially when the central bank does not undertake any 
supportive action to back up its announcement. Without coercion or any other central 
bank intervention, it is evident that financial markets would react favorably only if the 
indicated change in financial conditions seemed appropriate to market participants. 
Perhaps most obviously, following the central bank’s lead would feel appropriate if it was 
widely recognized that a rise in the demand for financing relative to the supply was 
needed to eliminate the excess supply existing at current market levels.   
However if market conditions were apparent, the market would simply adjust on 
its own without waiting for such a declaration from the central bank and the announced 
change by the central bank in the same direction as the market would then merely 
confirm that the central bank was staying in step with the market (or following it). This is 
not, of course, what we would want “leading the market” to mean.  Hence the more 
                                                 
5  For example, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England’s discussion of the transmission 
mechanism devotes over four fifths of its discussion space to what happens after key interest rates have 
been affected.  
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important case involves answering how a central bank can lead the market to lower 
interest rates and easier credit conditions when financial market participants are not 
inclined to bring about that adjustment themselves. 
 A central bank can effectively lead with an interest rate signal when market 
frictions delay the appropriate reaction of the financial system to the changing state of the 
economy. Frictions can arise when, for example, the move to a higher interest rate more 
appropriate to current market conditions is delayed out of concern that public reaction to 
higher borrowing rates will impact adversely the initiating bank. Here a signal from the 
central bank that higher rates are appropriate can deflect from the initiator any adverse 
public outcry. Similarly, frictions in moving to a lower interest rate can sometimes come 
from lenders’ reluctance to accept individually lower returns, but can be overcome by the 
central bank’s signal that lower borrowing rates will be forthcoming. 
 Somewhat more generally, uncertainty over the course of future interest rates 
provides an information role for the central bank. This is possible when a central bank 
has been able to establish a reputation for predicting more accurately the future course of 
interest rates and the economy than other market participants.  Establishing a track record 
of appropriate policy rate changes ahead of the market can generate the credibility needed 
by a central bank to produce market followers to its policy rate announcements.  In which 
case when market conditions weaken the willingness of market participants to hold the 
line at existing interest rate levels, a well-regarded, forward-looking central bank can 
initiate change simply by signaling that a change is now in order.  Markets will respond 
to the policy signal without any need for the central bank to alter the amount of base 
money it supplies to the banking system.  Should any base money change be called for, 
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that change should only be accommodative, passively supplying the higher demand for 
base money that will arise at lower interest rate levels.6 Any active increase in base 
money to reinforce the interest rate signal would prompt only further systemic response 
that would exaggerate the desired movement in interest rates. By re-enforcing the 
downward interest rate movement with active base money intervention, the transmission 
process will overshoot its desired macroeconomic target. 
Under the conditions specified, then, discretionary monetary policy can be carried 
out simply by announcing that a different interest rate is now in order.  In Wicksellian 
terms, the market comes to accept that the central bank is better informed of the changes 
needed to preserve the current macro environment and thus accepts the bank’s judgement 
of the appropriate level for the natural rate.  Seeing a reliable signal of a new natural rate, 
market participants will adjust their own rates accordingly. 
 In circumstances where the central bank has less credibility, market participants 
may not acquiesce to the central bank’s judgment and/or direction.  Hence should it be 
necessary, central banks such as the Bank of Canada, the U.S. Fed, the Bank of England, 
and the European Central Bank, all have the ability to set the market rate of their policy 
variable. Specific details vary country by country, but all methods involve temporary 
market interventions to move the market rate to its desired policy level. Thus, when the 
central bank interprets current circumstances correctly, a change in the asset and/or 
liability composition of its holdings will allow the central bank to change the market rate 
of its policy variable and the intervention needed to produce that change can be reversed 
                                                 
6 This change is not ongoing but once-and-for-all in nature. 
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when the changed circumstances are recognized.7  In this case the central bank imposes 
the appropriate rate ahead of the market and thus guides the market to the new 
equilibrium.  Should direct sales or purchases by the bank be necessary (leading to 
changes in base money), these changes can (must) be withdrawn when further guidance is 
not needed. In normal circumstances sufficient credibility is present so that market 
participants themselves will usually move the market rate to the targeted policy rate on 
their own.  Should more be necessary, central banks have sufficient market presence to 
ensure that at least one interest rate in the economy is fixed at a lower level. 
 When the expectations of financial market are not in line with the central bank, 
the central bank’s ability to fix one interest rate will not ensure that all other rates will 
automatically follow the policy rate downwards.  Hence to explain why a single market 
rate change can set off the required changes in all other rates another mechanism is 
required.  Here two types of answers are often given.  One answer relies on the central 
bank’s position as the monopoly supplier of base money to impose its will on the 
markets. Thus in this approach if it is known that the central bank wants interest rates 
lowered (e.g., if moral suasion is applied), other institutions follow accordingly.  Should 
this fail, the central bank can purchase or sell directly at any point of the term/liquidity 
spectrum.8 Indeed, just knowing that a central bank can contest a financial market can be 
sufficient in itself to have market rates move to the desired levels. 
In the absence of coercion and direct market participation, the existence of a 
stable yield curve across securities of higher risk and longer duration is needed.  Here it is 
                                                 
7 Should the wrong rate be imposed on the economy, current market conditions and/or the steady state 
position of the economy will be altered--Wicksell’s cumulative process will be initiated.  
8 The ability to deal at any point in the liquidity scale is sometimes constrained by operational and/or 
constitutional  restrictions on the central bank. 
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arbitrage—the ability to profit by three way trading among different interest rate, risk and 
duration classes—that generates and preserves yield differentials across adjacent security 
types. Thus the ability of the central bank to change the yield at the short end of the 
liquidity spectrum generates no-risk profit opportunities across adjacent securities that 
provide the incentives that ultimately cause all other rates to fall into line.  When this 
happens there is no need for any other change to set off the chain reaction alteration of 
financial conditions, no other central bank action needed to start the transmission process.  
If occasionally base money operations are needed to compensate for market 
misperception, their only purpose is to guide market participants to accept the desired 
policy rate value.  A permanent change in base money is not a prerequisite for 
maintaining the desired change in monetary conditions. 
The hallmark of the pure interest rate policy approach under normal conditions is 
then the purely secondary role assigned to base money. When the purpose of monetary 
policy is to maintain an existing macroeconomic target (such as an inflation rate) by 
adjusting to real changes in the macro environment, transitory/incidental changes in base 
money can be neutralized. Base money management plays only a passive role in ensuring 
that excess supplies and/or demands for base money are neutralized at the desired policy 
rate. Transactions in central bank currency or in foreign exchange which impact on base 
money need to be neutralized to prevent unwanted secondary effects on interest rates.  
III. Problems Caused by a Global Financial Crisis 
 This convenient arrangement comes to an end when severe financial upheaval 
leads to a period of financial instability. Starting with a key financial market freezing up 
or with the burst of a conspicuous financial bubble, system wide concerns now arise with 
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bankruptcies, both with respect to financial institutions deemed “too big to fail” and with 
small to medium sized firms susceptible to contagion. Fear of systemic failure introduces 
an additional unsettling prospect into otherwise secure investments, at the same time as it 
reduces the risk tolerance of market lenders. The combination puts restrictive pressure on 
monetary conditions that further depresses macroeconomic performance. 
 The natural reaction of a central bank operating under the interest-rate approach is 
to encourage lower interest rates by moving its policy rate setting downwards. However, 
lower interest rates have only a marginal effect on the likelihood of specific bankruptcies 
and/or new systemic risks when major financial firms are viewed as under-capitalized, 
holding financial assets that have now become illiquid and/or worthless. Thus reliance on 
interest rate policy alone to counter a severe liquidity crisis, as the recent 2007/08 crisis 
has demonstrated, may force a central bank to lower its policy rate virtually to zero to 
prevent the contraction of aggregate demand needed to maintain its inflation target.  In 
persistent crises, multiplying liquidity concerns exacerbate the growing gap between 
notional and effective demand and require ever lower levels of the nominal rate to 
counter falling demand in increasingly myopic product and financial markets.  The 
problem becomes particularly acute when expectations become so depressed that a policy 
rate below zero is needed to maintain macroeconomic stability.  That is, the level of 
aggregate demand needed to maintain output and the inflation rate target can be produced 
only by generating a negative interest rate to tax savings and subsidize investment.  
However because a nominal return of zero can always be earned simply by holding 
currency, the technical inability to tax money holdings (in periods when deflation rather 
than inflation is the immediate concern) places a lower bound on nominal yields at zero.  
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Hence the impracticality of over-riding the zero interest rate bound places a restriction on 
an interest rate approach to monetary policy when liquidity/systemic issues become a 
severe enough. Interest rates can no longer be used to get as much financial easing as is 
called for to maintain aggregate demand.9 
While the zero interest rate bound presents this problem in sharpest relief, the 
same problem--but to a lesser degree--arises whenever interest rates alone are relied upon 
in a financial crisis to achieve the market conditions appropriate to normal times.  Here 
reaction to abnormal circumstances requires the central bank to lower the policy rate 
more than otherwise (where this requirement is signalled in the market by market rates 
not following the policy rate downwards).  In such cases, the crisis itself creates a further 
set of perverse expectations that shift the supply and demand functions for lending and 
borrowing in ways that breaks the link between the policy rate and other lending and 
borrowing rates.10  To give one example, the failure of the asset backed commercial paper 
market in Canada in August 2007 drove many non-bank lenders from securities markets 
and resulted in unfulfilled demands for loans shifting to Canadian banks. This lessened 
the incentive that banks had to lower their lending rates when the Central Bank’s policy 
rate was lowered.  At the same time, banks were faced with raising funds from risk-
adverse depositors who focused increasingly on the growing possibility of borrower 
bankruptcy.  The consequence was to buoy up deposit rates that would normally have 
been lowered in step with the falling policy rate.  Reliance on interest rate policy to 
                                                 
9  According to one account, the U.S. federal funds rate implied by the Taylor rule needed to be set well 
below zero in the fall of 2009.  Federal monetary policy was thus unable to be easy enough to reverse 
prevailing market conditions.  See RBC Dominion Securities Strategy Quarterly, Fall 2009, p.6. 
10  This is analogous to the problem faced for money supply management when financial innovations 
changed the money multipliers, breaking the traditional links between base money and the broader 
definitions of money such as M1, M2, and M3. 
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overcome such obstacles then requires even more aggressive intervention by the central 
bank.11 
 To give up on the interest rate that is appropriate to maintain the longer term 
inflation target is not only to abandon the pure interest rate approach but also to risk 
destabilizing inflationary expectations.  Hence, if inflation control is indeed the primary 
policy concern, the central bank may choose to stick with it normal policy rate setting and 
resort to a second strategy—use of its traditional lender of last resort facilities--to deal 
with the over-tight market conditions that result from financial disruption. Such a strategy 
unbundles two policy objectives that have become intertwined—inflation targeting and 
financial stability--by adopting two dedicated market instruments.  With its lender of last 
resort function directed at countering financial market instability; interest rate policy can 
be reserved for inflation control and the adjustments required in the face of normal 
market disruption.  Indeed, as the crisis of 2007/08 has revealed, success in pursuing an 
inflation target has not ensured that financial stability can be maintained when major 
financial shocks occur.  This suggests that financial stability in its own right could be a 
separate objective for monetary policy, one requiring its own separate policy 
instrument.12 
 The recent experience of the 2007/8 liquidity crisis then reveals how complicated 
the interest rate approach to monetary policy must become when interest rates alone are 
required to deal with all of these complex issues simultaneously. For the pure signalling 
                                                 
11  The problem becomes even more acute if the market loses its faith in the reliability of central bank to 
foresee market developments and hence becomes less willing to follow the central bank’s signal. 
12   The alternative of using monetary policy to lean against the wind to combat financial instability with a 
lower than normal market rate as is often advocated (see Carney 2009) uses an impersonal and general 
instrument against a problem that is both personal and specific. The use of the lender of last resort facilities 
to target specific financial bankruptcies and market failures seems more directed and hence appropriate.  
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role of the interest rate approach to work effectively, levels of risk aversion must remain 
constant; the compounding effects of illiquidity and/or perverse expectations induced 
shifts in the supply and demand for loanable funds must be avoided; and credibility in 
central bank direction must be maintained.  Doing so allows a pure interest rate approach 
to achieve its macroeconomic objective(s) without having its required interest rate signal 
fall below zero.  Maintaining these conditions generates a steady, predictable demand for 
base money and avoids the sudden changes in these holdings that prove so unsettling to 
markets and the achievement of macroeconomic objectives.  The successful experience of 
Canada and many other countries in inflation targeting through interest-rate directed 
monetary policy in the period from the early 1990’s through August 2007 suggests that 
such conditions are often present. 
 It is then during a severe financial crisis that the interest rate approach to 
monetary policy needs to be supplemented by lender of last resort facilities. Under its 
provisions lending can take a variety of specific forms – from taking over currently 
illiquid assets, granting loan guarantees, and providing capital injections -- and can be 
aimed at specific segments of the financial system to directly contain the threat of 
systemic risk and lower excessive risk aversion.13 This amounts to directing its lender of 
last resort measures specifically at the objective of maintaining financial stability and 
leaving the use of the policy rate to pursue the separate objective of price stability. When 
lender of last resort measures are introduced early enough in a crisis, they can maintain 
financial stability overall and so preserve the effect of policy rate changes on interest 
rates in general. Knowing that a liquidity squeeze at an individual financial institution 
                                                 
13  The separation of lender of last resort activities from those designed to stabilize prices/output allows also 
for a more directed attack on the moral hazard issues raised by widespread generalized lending in times of 
crisis.  
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will be addressed by central bank liquidity measures can counter any reluctance that other 
financial institutions might have in lowering their deposit rates in the face of investor 
resistance, and qualified lenders will be more inclined to lower lending rates, in step with 
policy rate changes, with less concern for jeopardizing their ready access to last resort 
funding measures. 
 Throughout the role of the interest rate approach is to keep interest rates at the 
level dictated by the price or inflation target.  Doing so assigns responsibility for the 
maintenance of financial stability to lender of last resort measures. If they succeed, the 
preservation of financial stability removes the additional downward pressure on monetary 
conditions arising from the crisis itself.  This is then all that is needed to preserve the 
effectiveness of the interest rate approach.  In such cases, the interest rate approach can 
remain effective during a major financial crisis.14 
  
IV. Implications of a Persistent Financial Crisis for Monetary Policy 
 In the previous section, it was presumed that a financial crisis was either small or 
short enough that lender of last resort interventions could prevent the instability and 
contraction within the financial sector from spilling over into product markets (the so-
called real economy).  Should the later happen, there are more serious complications for 
the interest rate approach, even when lender of last resort measures can ultimately restore 
financial stability.  In cases when financial contraction extends into product markets, the 
increasingly pessimistic expectations of unemployed workers for viable employment and 
of firms for realizable sales mean that the policy rate level appropriate for maintaining 
                                                 
14 Mishkin (2009) has argued that U.S. monetary policy did not lose its effectiveness during the 2007/8 
crisis, although he also noted that interest rate manipulation alone could not offset financial disruptions and 
thus required the use of other (unspecified) monetary policy tools. 
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price stability (or full employment) under normal conditions will no longer suffice.  The 
same policy rate level now implies monetary conditions that will be tighter than desired 
(given current expectations). Moreover the spill-over effect and the contraction multiplier 
activated no longer imply that the level of aggregate demand needed to produce the 
targeted inflation rate can be achieved even if the policy rate is lowered to its lower 
bound.  In such circumstances there is nothing further that can be achieved by way of 
interest rate changes and this possibility presents monetary policy with its most serious 
challenge. 
 Off-hand the possibility that monetary policy can be completely ineffective seems 
unlikely because there seems to be no obstacle to a central bank making an injection of 
new base money into the financial system to achieve whatever monetary expansion is 
needed to ease “too tight” monetary conditions. Under normal conditions, this is the case 
– as illustrated in the familiar text book model of the banking multiplier process. But 
normal conditions allow interest rates to move downward.  In these circumstances new 
base money in excess of current banking transaction needs will lead banks to lower 
lending rates and in this way generate the monetary expansion. 
 When interest rates are at their zero interest rate bound, however, there is no 
scope for banks to expand their balance sheets and thus trigger the money multiplier. 
There is now no mechanism for banks to induce the private sector to borrow more than it 
is already doing.  In short, with interest rates at their lowest possible level, normal 
monetary policy operations to push more base money into the system are akin to 
“pushing on a string”.15 
                                                 
15 If money were freely provided by the central bank – in helicopter fashion – by simply crediting the 
accounts of all banks gratuitously with more base money, banks could afford to expand by lowering their 
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 Because central banks can ignore profitability, new money can be injected into the 
system by buying existing securities at prices above current market values. However, 
such purchases are likely to have only a temporary distorting effect on selected segments 
of the financial market. Unless the strategy changes the incentive for individuals and/or 
firms to use the money created, the new base money generated by subsidized purchases 
will simply pool in the banking system.16 Given that the demand for money is primarily 
to hold and not to spend, monetary policy is no nearer to achieving its macroeconomic 
objective. 
Two more extreme possibilities remain. First a central bank could always flood a 
banking system with base money - the present-day version of running the money printing 
presses – by buying up outstanding government securities. If done on sufficient scale 
such purchases would ultimately create asset portfolios sufficiently lopsided and real 
balance wealth effects sufficiently large to produce the required expansionary reaction. 
Such a strategy, however, is well beyond what is considered normal monetary policy 
operations – indeed could be construed as an abdication of monetary policy as such.   
 Alternatively, market purchases of foreign exchange by the central bank are 
another avenue that a central bank might be tempted to explore.  Here the aim would be 
to weaken a country’s exchange rate for its short run stimulating macro effects and could 
be a tempting strategy when the exchange rate is strengthening contrary to the depressed 
state of the economy. Currency devaluations to stimulate foreign spending on domestic 
                                                                                                                                                 
credit standards (rather than rates) and so acquire sub-standard securities or mortgages. Such a strategy 
would not maintain financial stability, however, since its incentives encourage riskier, inefficient lending. 
16 Regulatory bank capital ratios do restrict the amount of earning assets subject to default risk that banks 
can acquire even when they have excess base money to employ. This is a case of where a regulation for 
financial stability runs into conflict with monetary policy operations. 
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goods and discourage domestic sending on foreign goods is more a risky political strategy 
move than monetary policy in the sense the strategy is likely to invoke charges and 
consequences of the “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies adopted in the 1930’s. 
 Consequently ruling out such abnormal or distorting actions by the central bank 
means that monetary policy can do no more in a recession than stick with the interest rate 
approach, set its policy rate as low as it can go consistent with its primary target, and rely 
on its lender of last resort measures to restore and maintain financial stability.  If all that 
fails to achieve its macroeconomic target within the usual time frame, the central bank 
should admit this limitation to managing the economy and encourage the government to 
pursue other non-central-banking simulative measures. Refusing to recognize the 
limitations of interest rate policy leads to the temptation of lowering the macro objectives 
expected of central banking and/or to accept longer intervals for interest rate policy 
achieving its desired target.  In neither case will this improve the management of the 
economy.  The solution for better monetary policy is much easier—simply adopting the 
set of policies appropriate for the current state of the economy.  
V. Conclusions 
 Simply because a deep global financial crisis has posed difficulties for the interest 
rate approach to monetary policy is no reason to search for modifications to the basic 
approach. To make permanent changes in response to a transitory crisis would not be 
efficient.  Post-crisis, the interest rate approach retains its validity for pursuing the goal of 
inflation control because the conditions needed for its effectiveness – namely financial 
stability coupled with normal levels of financial risks and degrees of risk tolerance – can 
reasonably be expected to be features of normal times. 
 18
 In a financial crisis, however, the interest rate approach cannot in itself guarantee 
financial stability and that objective, we have argued, should be assigned to another long-
standing instrument of central banking – namely that of lender of last resort. This is not a 
reflection of a flaw in the interest rate approach but of the realization that a second 
objective for monetary policy arises during a financial crisis.  As an example of the well-
known maxim that two objectives require two instruments, the policy rate becomes the 
instrument for achieving monetary goals and the lender of last resort measures becomes 
the instrument for achieving financial stability. Their ability to distinguish cures that 
require impersonal and general interventions versus those that are personal and specific 
reinforces the desirability of this separation. 
 Finally, the current crisis has brought the recognition that monetary policy can be 
ineffective if the lender of last resort function fails to restore financial stability or if 
financial market spill-overs into the rest of the economy mean that even a zero interest 
rate can not lead the economy to operate at its targeted level.  Here normal injections of 
base money into the financial system cannot be counted on to revive flagging spending 
propensities. In such cases, we have argued, it is better to accept this limitation in 
monetary policy than alter the aim or instruments of monetary policy in order to conform 
to what policy can currently achieve.  As long as the economy is to be managed, it is 
better to turn to non-monetary means than to disrupt the functioning of monetary policy 
and the performance that can be achieved by the interest rate approach in more normal 
times. 
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